

- Greindl, M. 1938. *ΚΛΕΟΣ ΚΥΔΟΣ ΕΥΧΟΣ ΤΙΜΗ ΦΑΤΙΣ ΔΟΞΑ: Eine bedeutungsgeschichtliche Untersuchung des epischen und lyrischen Sprachgebrauches*. Lengerich (Ph.D. diss., Munich, 1937).
- Hainsworth, B. 1993. *The "Iliad": A Commentary*. Vol. 3, *Books 9–12*. Cambridge.
- Katz, J. T. Forthcoming. The Indo-European Background of Homeric Formula. In *Proceedings of the Colloquium "Les Enjeux théoriques des débats sur la formule homérique"* (April 2000), ed. P. Rousseau and G.-J. Pinault. Lille.
- Kuhn, A. 1853. Über die durch Nasale erweiterten Verbalstämme. *ZVS* 2:455–71.
- Mader, B. 1979. Ἀφθίτος. *Lex. des frühgriechischen Epos* 1:1705–8.
- Martin, R. P. 1989. *The Language of Heroes: Speech and Performance in the "Iliad"*. Ithaca.
- Matasović, R. 1996. *A Theory of Textual Reconstruction in Indo-European Linguistics*. Frankfurt.
- Nagy, G. 1974. *Comparative Studies in Greek and Indic Meter*. Cambridge, Mass.
- . 1981. Another Look at *kleos aphthiton*. *WJA* 7:113–16.
- . 1990a. *Greek Mythology and Poetics*. Ithaca.
- . 1990b. *Pindar's Homer: The Lyric Possession of an Epic Past*. Baltimore.
- . 2000. Distorsion diachronique dans l'art homérique: Quelques précisions. In *Constructions du temps dans le monde grec ancien*, ed. C. Darbo-Peschanski, 417–26. Paris.
- Nicole, J. 1891. *Les Scolies genevoises de "l'Iliade"*. Paris.
- Olson, S. D. 1995. *Blood and Iron: Stories and Storytelling in Homer's "Odyssey"*. Leiden.
- Parke, H. W., and D. E. W. Wormell. 1956. *The Delphic Oracle*. Oxford.
- Schmitt, R. 1967. *Dichtung und Dichtersprache in indogermanischer Zeit*. Wiesbaden.
- Schwyzler, E. 1950. *Griechische Grammatik*. Vol. 2, *Syntax und syntaktische Stilistik*. Munich.
- Watkins, C. 1992. The Comparison of Formulaic Sequences. In *Reconstructing Languages and Cultures*, ed. E. C. Polomé and W. Winter, 391–418. Berlin.
- . 1995. *How to Kill a Dragon: Aspects of Indo-European Poetics*. New York.

## EPICURUS ON THE VALUE OF FRIENDSHIP (*SENTENTIA VATICANA* 23)

### 1. THE ORTHODOX READING

The only surviving manuscript of Epicurus' *Sententiae Vaticanae*, codex Vaticanus Graecus 1950, includes the following curious claim as number twenty-three (*Sent. Vat.* 23):

πᾶσα φιλία δι' αὐτὴν ἀρετὴ, ἀρχὴν δὲ εἴληφεν ἀπὸ τῆς ὠφελείας.

The initial clause has long seemed especially puzzling. Is this a good Greek way of saying that “every friendship is by itself a virtue”? And what would Epicurus mean by calling friendship a virtue? The overwhelming majority of editors, translators, and commentators have found the manuscript sufficiently problematic to adopt Usener's emendation of αἰρετή for ἀρετή.<sup>1</sup> This move has several points going for it: other

This project was originally stimulated by an interesting and as yet unpublished paper by John MacFarlane. I am grateful to him for the paper and for discussion. I would also like to thank Elizabeth Asmis and Bob Lamberton for helpful conversations; an audience at the 1998 meeting of the American Philological Association for valuable feedback; John MacFarlane, Casey Perin, and James Warren for thoughtful criticism of previous drafts; and the editor and two anonymous referees for insightful comments on the penultimate version.

1. The emendation appears in the first publication of the *Sententiae Vaticanae* (also called the *Gnomologium Vaticanum*), in Wotke and Usener 1888. The roster of those who adopt Usener's emendation is imposing, including editors (von der Mühl 1922; Bailey 1926; Diano 1946; Arrighetti 1973; Marcovich 1999),

manuscripts show confusion over this paleographically similar pair (at, e.g., Epicurus *Ep. Men.* 129), δι' ἑαυτὴν fits better with αἰρετή than with ἀρετή, and the emended clause gives Epicurus the perfectly intelligible claim that "every friendship is choice-worthy in itself."

I maintain, however, that this claim should not be attributed to Epicurus because it singularly contradicts the rest of the evidence concerning his view of friendship. Defenders of the orthodoxy must show either how interpretive charity can tolerate such a contradiction or how the emended claim does not in fact contradict central Epicurean tenets, despite initial appearances. I argue that neither sort of defense can succeed. Hence, I offer two alternative approaches to *Sententia Vaticana* 23. First, I give an interpretation of the manuscript reading that agrees happily with what we know of Epicurus' view of friendship, and then, after discussing the philological objection to the manuscript reading, I speculate on the possibility that we should emend *Sententia Vaticana* 23 but attribute it to some later Epicurean. Both of these alternatives have advantages and disadvantages, and I am not entirely decided between them. I am, however, firmly convinced that both are superior to the orthodox view that attributes the emended text to Epicurus, and my primary aim here is to argue for this conviction.

## 2. AGAINST THE ORTHODOX READING

The emended version of *Sententia Vaticana* 23 says that every friendship is intrinsically choiceworthy. But Epicurus must think that every friendship is choiceworthy only for the sake of pleasure, for he clearly holds that every choice should be referred to pleasure, that is, to the absence of mental disturbance (ἀταραξία) and of physical pain (*Ep. Men.* 128–29, *RS* 25; cf. Diog. Laert. 10.34, Cic. *Fin.* 1.23). There is at least

---

translators (Geer 1964; Bignone 1964; Inwood and Gerson 1997), scholars discussing Epicurean friendship (Brescia 1955a; Festugière 1955; Gemelli 1978; MacFarlane 1997; Mitsis 1988; Müller 1972, and 1991; O'Connor 1989; Preuss 1994; Rist 1972 and 1980; Rocca 1993), and writers on Hellenistic thought more generally (Annas 1993; Long 1986a; Sharples 1996). It is worth noting, too, that several of these (although by no means all: see esp. MacFarlane 1997; and Sharples 1996) express strong confidence in the emendation. Bailey (1926, 379), for example, takes it to be "a necessary correction," and Inwood and Gerson (1997, p. 37, n. 22) "regard the emendation as virtually certain."

I have found only three adherents to the manuscript, none of whom makes the defense that I think is required: (1) A. A. Long's adherence manifests itself in Long and Sedley 1987 and in Long 1986b. Long interprets Epicurus as saying that friendship is "an inherently pleasurable state of mind, and not just a means to that end" (Long and Sedley 1987, 1:138; cf. Long 1986b, 305). But even if it were acceptable to think of friendship as both intrinsically and instrumentally valuable—I shall argue against this view—Epicurus would not make this point by calling friendship a virtue. To Epicurus, virtue is *merely* instrumentally valuable: see Epicurus, Περὶ τέλους ap. Athenaeus 12.596f (Usener frag. 70); Diog. Laert. 10.138; Cic. *Fin.* 2.48 and 2.69; Usener frags. 504–5, 509–15. Hence, Long is wrong to suggest that whether ἀρετή or αἰρετή is read, "the problem of assigning a *per se* value to something other than pleasure is unaffected" (Long and Sedley 1987, 2:132; cf. Long 1986b, 305). (2) David Konstan (1996a, 391; 1997, 110) also accepts the manuscript reading, and provides an interesting account of it (see n. 24 below). But far from showing what is wrong with the orthodox approach, he in fact replicates what I take to be the orthodoxy's fundamental error when he attributes to Epicurus the claim that φιλία "comes to be valued for its own sake" (1997, 110). (3) The best defense of the manuscript is presented by Jean Bollack (1975, 451). He notes that the philological evidence underdetermines the matter, and he perceives that anyone who emends "se trouve devant la double difficulté d'avoir à opposer l'affirmation du caractère désintéressé de l'amitié à la doctrine utilitariste, et à expliquer, dans le cas particulier, pourquoi le caractère utilitaire demeure limité à l'origine." But as he explains the contrast, it is not between interestedness and disinterestedness, but between the pursuit of friendship for some external benefit and the practice of friendship which itself is the benefit ("L'intérêt s'y satisfait pleinement, dans la seule pratique de l'amitié . . . aussitôt qu'elle (*viz.*, l'amitié) existe, le bienfait est dans l'amitié, en dehors des bienfaits qui la motivaient"). This, too, extends Epicurus' account too far.

prima facie tension between the claim that friendship is intrinsically choiceworthy and the claim that everything is choiceworthy for the sake of pleasure alone, since to say that something is intrinsically choiceworthy is standardly to say that it is choiceworthy without regard to anything else. Thus, anyone who adopts the orthodox reading by attributing the emended *Sententia Vaticana* 23 to Epicurus must explain how we can charitably attribute this tension to him or how the emended claim is in fact consistent with the foundations of Epicurean ethics, despite initial appearances.

The former strategy can be employed in three different ways. First, one might insist that there is other evidence that Epicurus finds friendship to be choiceworthy *per se*, and one might then conclude that the sum of the evidence leaves us with no choice but to attribute to Epicurus a contradictory account of friendship. Phillip Mitsis, for example, has argued that the first Epicurean account of friendship that Torquatus discusses in *De Finibus* attributes to Epicurus the view that friendship is intrinsically choiceworthy.<sup>2</sup> Torquatus' first Epicurean account of friendship includes three crucial claims (Cic. *Fin.* 1.66–68):

(A) Some [Epicureans] . . . deny that those pleasures that pertain to our friends should be sought (*expetendas*) *per se* as much as we seek our own.

(B) For we enjoy the joy (*laetitia*) of our friends just as much (*aeque*) as our own and we suffer equally their sorrows (*pariter dolemus angoribus*).

(C) Thus (*quocirca*), the sage will be moved with respect to his friend just as he will in his own case (*eodem modo sapiens erit affectus erga amicum quo in se ipsum*) and whatever work he would take on for his own pleasure, he will take on for his friend's pleasure.

I do not wish to quarrel with Mitsis' conclusion that all three of these claims accurately represent the views of Epicurus himself,<sup>3</sup> but I reject his suggestion that claim (C) supports the attribution of the emended *Sententia Vaticana* 23 to Epicurus.<sup>4</sup> First, even if claim (C) says that the sage will value his friend for her sake (i.e., independent of his own pleasure), it does not say that he will value *friendship* for its own sake. There is a difference between valuing friends and valuing friendship.<sup>5</sup> But moreover, claim (C) does not even say that the sage will value his friend for her sake. There are two constraints on our interpretation of claim (C). First, we should take care lest claim

2. When originally citing the emended *Sent. Vat.* 23, Mitsis (1988, p. 100, n. 6) also cites *RS* 27, Cic. *Fin.* 1.65, and Cic. *Fin.* 2.83, but he rightly does not insist that these passages support the claim that friendship is intrinsically choiceworthy. (The first two say only that friendship is the most valuable contributor to the pleasant life; I confess to missing the relevance of the third.) Bailey (1926, 379) is not so cautious and misleadingly suggests that the emended *Sent. Vat.* 23 simply agrees with Diog. Laert. 10.120 and *RS* 27.

3. Mitsis 1988, p. 102 and p. 112, n. 26. Cicero gives us ample reason to attribute all three claims to Epicurus by presenting them as parts of just one position, by saying that only this position contains words of Epicurus himself (*Fin.* 2.82), and by kicking off and wrapping up his presentation of this position with citations of Epicurus' actual words (*Fin.* 1.65 and 1.68). Moreover, because Cicero quite clearly suggests that the other two positions are not attributable to Epicurus (*Fin.* 2.82) and because it would be odd to think that no Epicureans in Cicero's time were defending Epicurus' own view, it should be odd to think that this first account is not Epicurus' own.

4. Mitsis 1988, 100–101 and 102.

5. Compare the difference between valuing students and valuing the professor-student relation. This distinction is even more marked if we heed Konstan's caution about conflating talk of friends with talk of φίλια. Konstan (1996b, 75; cf. 1996a, 387–88, and 1997, 8–9 and 53–56) maintains that "*philia* . . . designates a wide variety of positive affective bonds including relations among kin, fellow citizens, comrades in arms, and friends" while "the concrete noun *philos* (distinguished more or less unambiguously from the adjective meaning 'dear' when modified by the definite article) applies specifically to the more narrow bond of friendship."

(C) contradict the claim in (A).<sup>6</sup> According to the latter claim, a friend's pleasure is not *per se* as desirable as one's own. The phrase *per se* is important. The claim in (A) does not say that a friend's pleasure is less desirable than one's own; it simply says that a friend's pleasure is not desirable *per se* as one's own is. In other words, the claim in (A) concerns the *finality* of the pleasure desired, and not the quantity of desire. Claim (C), that the sage will be moved *eodem modo* by a friend's pleasure and his own, would contradict claim (A) if it were saying that the sage is moved for his friend's pleasure for its own sake just as he is moved for his own pleasure for its own sake. To acquit Epicurus of this contradiction, we must construe *eodem modo* more generously. Claim (C) must concern not the finality of the pleasures desired, but the *motive force* of his desires: the sage is just as moved by his friend's pleasures as by his own, though he is moved in both cases, in the end, for the sake of his own pleasure. The second constraint on the interpretation of claim (C) is provided by the word *quocirca*, which marks claim (C) as an inference from claim (B). Claim (B) is solely about equal *intensity of feeling*. While it is quite reasonable to assume that equally intense feelings have equal motive force, it would be problematic to assume that equally intense feelings necessarily track the same final ends.<sup>7</sup> Thus, to save Epicurus from contradicting the claim in (A) and to make sense of the inference from claim (B), we should understand claim (C) to be saying only that the sage is as disposed to act on behalf of his friend's pleasure as on behalf of his own. This does not entail that the sage seeks his friend's pleasure *per se*, let alone that the sage seeks friendship *per se*. The emended version of *Sententia Vaticana* 23 stands alone in attributing to Epicurus this claim.<sup>8</sup>

For a second approach to the emended *Sententia Vaticana* 23, one might insist that it reflects not a problematic contradiction, but a virtuous tension. Perhaps Epicurus has actually come around to the best possible view of friendship, for one must value friendship for its own sake in order to value it at all, and there must then be conflicts between the intrinsic value of one's friendships and one's other important goals and projects.<sup>9</sup> I myself am sympathetic to this view of friendship, but there are excellent reasons not to attribute it to Epicurus. First, there is no other evidence that Epicurus admits of a tension in his account of friendship. Rather, there is copious evidence that he must value friendship for the sake of pleasure and just one emended sentence suggesting that he values friendship for its own sake. Furthermore, Epicurus has good reason to avoid admitting any tension into his account of friendship, since the human good on Epicurus' view requires the removal of disturbance (*ἀταραξία*) and tensions

6. O'Connor (1989, 184) finds it "utterly obscure" how (A) and (C) could consistently represent the same position and concludes that (B) and (C) should not be attributed to Epicurus. By contrast, my resolution of the apparent conflict between (A) and (C) allows us to respect Cicero's suggestions (see n. 3) that (A), (B), and (C) all represent Epicurus' position.

7. I owe this reconciliation of (A) and (C) to MacFarlane 1997, who distinguishes between finality and intensity in the passage, though I have added an additional layer by distinguishing between intensity and "motive force."

8. It is interesting, then, to note that Mitsis refers to the emended *Sent. Vat.* 23 (by number or by the central phrase *δι' αὐτὴν αἰετῇ*) nine times in the first half of his investigation into Epicurean friendship (Mitsis 1988, 98–114).

9. I have found no purveyors of this approach or of the next, but their possibility occurred to me when I was reflecting on Mitsis 1988, an interesting account of how and why Epicurus might have come to a contradiction in his account of friendship. Mitsis raises stimulating questions for thinking about hedonic approaches to ethics even if these questions do not, in the end, provide reason in the absence of positive evidence to attribute the contradictory assessment of friendship to Epicurus.

between one's friendships intrinsically valued and one's own pleasure are bound to be disturbing.

A close cousin of this second approach can be had by admitting that the tension is problematic for Epicurus' theory but insisting that his view of friendship without such a tension is even worse. In this case, our sympathy for the view that friendship has intrinsic value and introduces tensions into our lives is so strong that we would rather attribute this view (with the emended *Sententia Vaticana* 23) to Epicurus than find him with a consistent but less plausible account of friendship. To this I insist that consistency is the first (though not only) virtue of the philosopher. But I also insist that a consistent Epicurean view of friendship is not nearly as implausible as it is often made out to be. First, much of the alleged implausibility melts away if we allow that Epicurus may not be talking about what we mean by "friendship" when he is discussing  $\phi\lambda\iota\alpha$ . We tend to conceive of friendship as an intensely personal relationship between two people, and we tend to believe that this relationship requires each friend to subordinate his own pleasure at least occasionally. But  $\phi\lambda\iota\alpha$  is invoked very broadly in antiquity, and we ought at least to allow that Epicurus might be discussing something other than intensely personal relationships.<sup>10</sup> Second, if Epicurus limits  $\phi\lambda\iota\alpha$  to sages—and I shall argue below that he does—then the friendship he is discussing is available only to those who are unconcerned about death and are especially able to call to mind the pleasures of a friendship in order to overcome any pains that it will bring. Once we recognize that Epicurus' conception of friendship might be less personal and might assume Epicurean virtue, then we can see that the Epicurean friendship does not pose all of the risks of disturbance that one of our intensely personal relationships does.

Having considered three attempts to accept the tension that the emended *Sententia Vaticana* 23 provides for Epicurus' account, we can consider two ways of denying that the emended *Sententia Vaticana* 23 provides any tension whatsoever by arguing that  $\delta\iota'$   $\epsilon\alpha\upsilon\tau\eta\nu$   $\alpha\iota\rho\epsilon\tau\acute{\eta}$  does not imply that friendship is choiceworthy apart from pleasure. On one reading, Epicurus is contrasting the origin of friendship in its extrinsically pleasurable qualities ( $\alpha\pi\omicron$   $\tau\eta\varsigma$   $\omega\phi\epsilon\lambda\epsilon\iota\alpha\varsigma$ ) and the fully developed friendship's choiceworthiness for its intrinsically pleasurable qualities. On this view mature friendship produces pleasure "directly and without intermediaries"; it "brings pleasure in itself."<sup>11</sup> A second approach, suggested by David O'Connor, holds that the second clause of the emended *Sententia Vaticana* 23 does not contrast with the first but simply explains the origins of friendship's being  $\alpha\iota\rho\epsilon\tau\acute{\eta}$ , while the  $\delta\iota'$   $\epsilon\alpha\upsilon\tau\eta\nu$  just emphasizes that friendship is choiceworthy so far as it is concerned, considered apart from circumstances that may render it unchoiceworthy.<sup>12</sup>

10. O'Connor (1989) develops this point very well. For the range of  $\phi\lambda\iota\alpha$ , see Konstan 1996b and 1997. On Konstan's view, though, the broad range of  $\phi\lambda\iota\alpha$  includes the intensely personal, affective relationship for which we typically reserve the word "friend" and for which, he argues, the Greeks typically reserve the noun  $\phi\iota\lambda\omicron\varsigma$  (see n. 5 above). I am here suggesting that Epicurean  $\phi\lambda\iota\alpha$  excludes the intensely personal, affective relationship that we would call friendship.

11. I am quoting Rist 1972, 132, and Sharples 1996, 119, respectively. There seems to be the generally accepted view. Ironically, Long (1986b; see note 1) advances this interpretation of friendship's value as a defense of the manuscript, for he, along with Sharples (1996, p. 144, n. 5) and Dihle (in Long 1986b, 317), holds that there is no substantive difference between the manuscript reading and the emended version. I disagree: the manuscript calls  $\phi\lambda\iota\alpha$  an  $\alpha\rho\epsilon\tau\acute{\eta}$ , which means that friendship is not chosen  $\delta\iota'$   $\epsilon\alpha\upsilon\tau\eta\nu$  (see Diog. Laert. 10.138), contrary to the emended version's claim.

12. See O'Connor 1989, 185–86. O'Connor directs our attention to the claim that not every pleasure is  $\alpha\iota\rho\epsilon\tau\acute{\eta}$  (*Ep. Men.* 129), since some pleasures lead to a greater amount of pain (*RS* 8): these pleasures would

Both of these readings ignore the plain meaning of the phrase δι' αὐτὴν αἰρετή.<sup>13</sup> This phrase is a well-established term of art, a member of a standardized family of phrases that join διὰ, the accusative reflexive pronoun, and a verb (or verbal adjective) of choosing, valuing, or desiring, and that apply to things that are (to be) valued, desired, or chosen for themselves, without regard to what attends them. Aristotle, for example, explains his claim that "we choose honor, pleasure, intelligence (νοῦν), and every virtue also for themselves (δι' αὐτά)" by adding, "for if there were no consequence (μηθενὸς γὰρ ἀποβαίνοντος), we would still choose each of them" (*Eth. Nic.* 1097b2–4). This contrast also lies at the heart of Plato's division of goods in Book 2 of the *Republic*. There Socrates elaborately explains that some goods are desired and chosen for their own sake and not for their consequences (τῶν ἀποβαινόντων, 357b5–6), while others are chosen only for their consequences, and still others are chosen for both reasons (357b4–d3), and when Socrates and Glaucon need to refer simply to the central contrast, δι' αὐτό is pressed into service to represent what is intrinsically valued (358a1,6). Very much the same division is applied by the Stoics to preferred indifferents: some are preferred for themselves (δι' αὐτά or *per se*), some for their consequences, and some for both reasons.<sup>14</sup> Epicureans draw upon this tradition when they insist that pleasure is itself to be sought *per se* (Cic. *Fin.* 1.31: *voluptatem ipsam per se esse expetendam*).<sup>15</sup>

But this tradition makes it difficult to see what Epicurus could mean by the claim that friendship is choiceworthy *per se*. If we are told that friendship "brings" pleasures "directly" and "in itself," we are still told that friendship merely *brings* pleasure. This is not enough. Epicurus can heap praise on friendship as a safeguard (*praesidium*, Cic. *Fin.* 1.68, cf. 2.84) or as the greatest thing wisdom devises (*παρασκευάζεται*, RS 27; *comparaverit*, Cic. *Fin.* 1.65) for living happily. He can even laud friendship as pleasurable and insist that the activities of friendship are pleasant. But he cannot say that friendship *is* pleasure, for pleasure is the absence of mental and physical disturbance (*Ep. Men.* 131), and whatever friendship is, it is not that.

This problem can be expressed by a contrast between Epicurus and his predecessors. For Plato and Aristotle, something that is valuable *per se* is valuable regardless

be αἰρεταί insofar as they are pleasures, but would not be αἰρεταί insofar as they lead to a greater amount of pain.

13. O'Connor's reading has the additional infelicity of ignoring the apparently adversative force of the conjunction δέ.

14. Diog. Laert. 7.107; Cic. *Fin.* 3.56; and cf. Stobaeus 2.7 (80.15–16, and 82.21–83.9 Wachsmuth), which gives a slightly different account, dividing all indifferents that are in accordance with nature (not just the preferred ones, which are very much in accordance with nature) into just two groups, extrinsically and intrinsically valuable. Rist (1972, 132) appeals to these passages and suggests that since indifferents preferred δι' αὐτά are not "ultimately valuable," nothing that Epicurus finds choiceworthy δι' αὐτό needs to be "ultimately valuable." But Rist equivocates. For the Stoics, indifferents preferred δι' αὐτά are not "ultimately valuable" (in the sense of most valuable) because indifferents stand in a different scale of value and a different realm of choice than what is "ultimately valuable." (No Stoic wonders, "Should I be virtuous or should I value health?" In ordinary circumstances, both are cultivated simultaneously, although for very different reasons and with very different value attached.) In fact the Stoics are committed to the claim that indifferents preferred δι' αὐτά are "ultimately valuable" (in the sense of finally valuable), since there is nothing to be achieved as their consequence that is essential to their value. (For the Stoics, being virtuous does not change health's value (ἁξία) although it does ensure that one's health is a benefit (ὠφέλημα) to one, and so virtue is not even a condition of the value (ἁξία) of health, let alone a consequential condition.) The Epicurean comparing the value of friendship and pleasure is not in the position of the Stoic comparing health and virtue: for the Epicurean, who has only pleasure and pain as κριτήρια for action (Diog. Laert. 10.34 [with 10.31]; Cic. *Fin.* 1.34), the two ways of being "ultimately valuable" cannot pull apart.

15. Compare, too, the Cyrenaic use of αἰρετή δι' αὐτὴν for pleasure (Diog. Laert. 2.88–92).

of consequences but is nevertheless also valuable for the sake of happiness. When Aristotle, for example, says that honor is choiceworthy *per se*, he is not contradicting the claim that every choiceworthy thing is choiceworthy for the sake of happiness, for he may maintain that honor is a component of happiness (as the inclusivist interpreters would have it) or that choosing something for the sake of happiness is not like choosing *x* for its consequence *y* but like choosing *x* on account of its fit with a certain regulative ideal (as some other interpreters would have it). But Epicurus' conception of happiness—his conception of pleasure that is happiness—cannot be like the inclusivists' picture of Aristotelian happiness, and it seems to me to be insuperably difficult to see how it is like the regulative ideal, given, for example, the connections in Epicurus' account between animal pursuit of pleasure and our own (*Ep. Men.* 128). Epicurus' conception of happiness as pleasure and his conception of pleasure as the absence of mental and physical disturbance conspire to make it impossible for something other than pleasure to be valuable *per se*.<sup>16</sup>

Another way of seeing this problem is to compare friendship to the virtues. Despite the fact that friendship is praised as even more valuable than the virtues (*RS* 27, *Sent. Vat.* 78), the Epicureans appeal to the value of the virtues to explain the value of friendship (e.g., *Cic. Fin.* 1.66). In fact, Torquatus tells us that “the very things that have been said about the virtues, how they are always attached to pleasures, should be said about friendship” (*Cic. Fin.* 1.68), and he backs up (*enim*) this claim by quoting Epicurus himself. So it is not surprising to find that Epicurus describes the virtues as inseparable from pleasure. The virtues, like friendship, “bring” pleasure “directly” and “in themselves.”<sup>17</sup> But the doxographers also attribute to Epicurus the explicit denial that virtues are chosen for their own sake (αἰρεῖσθαι δι’ αὐτάς).<sup>18</sup> If we take seriously the suggestion that the same account of value should be given to both the virtues and friendship, then we should reject the emendation of *Sententia Vaticana* 23.

In sum, only one text would ask us to countenance the possibility that Epicurus has a self-contradictory account of friendship or that Epicurus somehow consistently holds that friendship is δι’ ἑαυτὴν αἰρετή despite his commitment to the claim that only pleasure is δι’ ἑαυτὴν αἰρετή. That text is the emended version of *Sententia Vaticana* 23. The philosophical problems it poses summon charity to search for an alternative to the orthodox reading, which attributes the emended *Sententia Vaticana* 23 to Epicurus.

16. No doubt, it is possible to disagree with my dogmatic claims about Epicurean pleasure. Some readers may want to assimilate Epicurean pleasure and happiness to, say, Plato's account in the *Republic*, which argues that justice is choiceworthy *per se* in part by arguing that justice is pleasurable. I cannot here mount a full defense of my interpretation of what is different about Epicurean pleasure. Instead, I point out that my interpretation of how Epicurean pleasure makes trouble for the orthodox reading of *Sent. Vat.* 23 is supported by the evidence concerning virtues (immediately following) and by Cicero's account of “the more timid Epicureans” (discussed in section 4).

17. For the claims that virtue necessarily leads to pleasure and that virtue and pleasure are mutually interentailing, see, e.g., *Ep. Men.* 132, *RS* 5; *Diog. Laert.* 10.138; *Cic. Fin.* 1.57.

18. The exact point is made at *Diog. Laert.* 10.138, and it is widely supported by the way the evidence for the merely instrumental value of virtue stresses a distance between virtue and pleasure. See especially Epicurus, *Περὶ τέλους* ap. Athenaeus 12.596f (*Usener frag.* 70); *Cic. Fin.* 2.48 and 2.69; *Usener frags.* 504–5, 509–15. This is perfectly consistent with the claims that virtue necessarily leads to pleasure and that virtue and pleasure are mutually interentailing, contra Annas (1993, 86), who cites these claims as evidence that Epicurus “sometimes suggests that the virtues have intrinsic value for the agent, since virtuous activity makes up and is part of the pleasure (of the right kind, of course) which the agent seeks.”

## 3. FIRST ALTERNATIVE

First, there is a natural way of unproblematically interpreting Epicurus' claim that every friendship is by itself a virtue: Epicurus is saying that friendship is an inherently virtuous state of soul.<sup>19</sup> Since virtues are valuable only instrumentally, Epicurus is not saying that friendship is valuable *per se*. Rather, he is making two points: friendship is a condition of one's soul and friendship is possible only for the virtuous.

The second of these points is easily attributed to Epicurus. Aristotle and the Stoics limit genuine friendship to the virtuous,<sup>20</sup> and there is independent evidence that Epicurus does the same. He says that it is wisdom (σοφία, *sapientia*) that devises friendships (*RS* 27; *Cic. Fin.* 1.65) and that it is the noble person (γενναῖος) who is concerned with wisdom and friendship (*Sent. Vat.* 78). Further, friendship is said to be "sustained by a commonality among those who are filled up with pleasures" (*Diog. Laert.* 10.120b), and Epicurean references to friends frequently identify them as sages.<sup>21</sup>

But can we attribute to Epicurus the claim that friendship is a condition of one's soul and not just a relationship to another? There is no reason not to. After all, character states and virtues require all sorts of things, and some of them, like justice, even require certain attitudes and behaviors in relation to others. So why should friendship not be a disposition of the soul toward certain beliefs and actions in relation to certain others? Here it is worth noting that the Stoics were at least tempted to say that two sages are friends (though not totally [πάντως] friends) even if they have never met, and that Aristotle (*Eth. Nic.* 1155a3–4) comfortably classes φιλία as either a kind of virtue (ἀρετή τις) or something "with virtue" (μετ' ἀρετῆς).<sup>22</sup> As the Stoics and Aristotle suggest, it would be implausible to say that friendship is *merely* a state of soul, but the manuscript for *Sententia Vaticana* 23 does not suggest that. It claims only that friendship is (perhaps among other things) a virtuous state of soul.

Not only is it possible for Epicurus to say this; he has good reason to do so. One difficulty his account of friendship faces is posed by the vulnerability that attachment to friends causes. But if friendship is a condition of one's soul and if friendship requires wisdom, then the vulnerability imposed by attachment to friends will be much less threatening.

19. We do not have to interpret the manuscript in such a way that every friendship is an "intrinsic virtue," contra Mitsis (1988, p. 101, n. 6) and Preuss (1994, p. 207, n. 32). We can take δι' ἑαυτὴν adverbially and not adjectivally, to mean "by itself" instead of "intrinsic." See the discussion of δι' ἑαυτὴν below.

20. For Aristotle, see, e.g., *Eth. Nic.* 1156b7–8 on "perfect (τελεία) friendship," and for the Stoics, see, e.g., *Diog. Laert.* 7.124.

21. *Diog. Laert.* 10.118 and 10.121b; *Cic. Fin.* 1.68 and 1.70. Also, Cicero's retort (*Fin.* 2.84) to the Epicureans that "there is enough protection in ordinary friendships" (*mediocribus amicitiiis*), makes sense only if they were interested in extraordinary friendship. It might be objected that a restriction of friendship to sages will make unintelligible the reports that Epicurus had huge numbers of friends (*Diog. Laert.* 10.9, *Cic. Fin.* 1.65), but it is entirely possible that these reports are trading on a different sense of "friends," as adherents to Epicurus' school.

22. For the Stoic position, see Stobaeus 2.7 (101.21 Wachsmuth): "All the excellent benefit each other—even when they are not totally (πάντως) friends with each other . . . on account either of being unknown or of not living in the same place, they are still disposed toward each other in a kindly, friendly (φιλικῶς), approving, and receptive fashion." See, too, Stobaeus 2.7 (94.27–95.2 Wachsmuth), where genuine friendship is called a good of the soul; cf. *Sen. Ep.* 9.8, in the context of comparing Stoic and Epicurean friendship: "The sage, even though he is content, nevertheless wishes to have a friend, if for no other reason than in order to exercise friendship, lest such [a?] great virtue go to waste (*ne tam magna virtus iaceat*)."



Finally, there is some independent evidence that Epicurus identified *φιλία* as an *ἀρετή*. I have mentioned that Epicureans were quick to analyze the value of friendship and virtue in the same way. But the evidence says more than this. According to Diogenes Laertius (10.138), “Epicurus says that virtue alone (*τὴν ἀρετὴν μόνην*) is inseparable (*ἀχώριστον*) from pleasure,” and Cicero attributes to Epicurus the view that friendship cannot be separated from pleasure (*Fin.* 1.66 and 1.68). From the conjunction of these two claims it follows that friendship is (at least a part of) virtue.<sup>23</sup>

I have been arguing that it makes good philosophical sense to attribute to Epicurus the view that *φιλία* is an *ἀρετή*, but this is not all that the manuscript reading of *Sententia Vaticana* 23 says. First, there is a second clause, contrasting the claim that *φιλία* is an *ἀρετή* with the start of friendship, which is “from its benefit” (*ἀπὸ τῆς ὠφελείας*). There is no denying that the contrast is easily and naturally explained for the emended version of *Sententia Vaticana* 23: with the emendation, there is a distinction drawn between instrumentally and finally valuable. But there is also a sensible contrast suggested by the manuscript reading, between the initial phase of friendship as utility friendship and the final phase in which friendship is fully developed and valued as a virtue.<sup>24</sup>

A second problem with the manuscript reading is more serious. The manuscript says that *φιλία* is *δι’ ἑαυτὴν ἀρετή*, and to this there is a serious philological objection. With just the substantive *ἀρετή*, *καθ’ ἑαυτὴν* would seem much more natural; it would seem that *δι’ ἑαυτὴν* needs some action expressed in a verb or implied in an adjective.<sup>25</sup> It must be admitted that *δι’ ἑαυτὴν* and its fellow travelers most often appear with verbal action expressed or implied.<sup>26</sup>

Yet there is some evidence that suggests that *δι’ αὐτό* without action expressed in a verb or implied in a verbal adjective is not impossible and is in fact related to the *καθ’ αὐτό* one would have expected in such a situation. Consider the following pas-

23. It is of course possible that Diogenes Laertius has gotten carried away with his addition of “alone” (*μόνη*): other accounts of the inseparability of virtue from pleasure do not insist that it alone is inseparable (*Ep. Men.* 132, *RS* 5; *Cic. Fin.* 1.57). But even if we choose to read *μόνη* away, we ought to recognize that Epicurus has good reasons not only to treat virtue and friendship in very similar ways but also to say that friendship is a virtue.

24. For a taxonomy of friendships that includes utility friendship and virtuous friendship, see *Arist. Eth. Nic.* 8.3, and the report on the Stoics at *Stobaeus* 2.7 (94.21–95.2 *Wachsmuth*). My suggestion that Epicurus saw every virtuous friendship as a development of utility friendship might get some support from *Diog. Laert.* 10.120b (“They believe . . . that friendship comes to be [*γίνεσθαι*] on account of its uses [*διὰ τὰς χρῆσας*]”) and from *Cic. Fin.* 2.84 (“Friendship is sought for the sake of usefulness [*utilitatis causa amicitia est quaesita*]”). But for an alternative reading of these passages, see *Konstan* (1996a, 392; 1997, 110–11). *Konstan* sees all of these claims about different stages of friendship as pieces of historical anthropology, akin to *Lucretius’* discussion in Book 5 of *De rerum natura*. On this reading, all *φιλία* (not every *φιλία*) first developed in human (pre-)history for its usefulness but is now a virtue.

25. *Dihle’s* response to *Long* 1985 puts the philological objection well (in *Long* 1986b, 317): “Aber *δι’ ἑαυτὴν* ist ein Ausdruck mit finaler Bedeutung, den man ungern einfach mit einem Substantiv verbindet. *Καθ’ ἑαυτὴν* läge näher.” This leads *Long* to suggest that perhaps we should suppose “the loss of a word such as *νενομίσται*” (1986b, 319), a suggestion that is surely more editorially intrusive than the paleographically plausible emendation.

26. A computerized search of eleven mostly philosophical prose authors in the *TLG* (*Aristotle*, *Chrysippus*, *Democritus*, *Demosthenes*, *Dio Chrysostom*, *Diogenes Laertius*, *Epicurus*, *Metrodorus*, *Plato*, *Xenophon*, and *Zeno*) for occurrences of *διά* plus the reflexive pronoun (spelled with or without the contraction) in the accusative case amply supports this generalization: out of 127 passages found, only the small handful quoted above provide any succor to the manuscript reading of *Sent. Vat.* 23. According to this search, *διά* + the reflexive pronoun in the accusative is most often used with *αἰρεῖσθαι* or a verb of valuing or desiring, and it also occurs very often for the assignment of responsibility to the agent standing as the subject of the clause.

sage from Clement of Alexandria's discussion of Stoic providence in his *Paedagogus* (1.8 136 Potts = SVF 2.1116):

That is also why justice is said to be a good not by possessing virtue—since it is a virtue—but by being itself in itself and by itself good (τῷ αὐτῇ καθ' αὐτὴν καὶ δι' αὐτὴν ἀγαθὴν εἶναι).

It might be objected that this is not a genuine parallel since καθ' αὐτό and δι' αὐτό are paired here and individual elements in linguistic pairs do not always work exactly as they do standing alone. But Clement's close association of καθ' αὐτό and δι' αὐτό has some support from Aristotle (*De an.* 406b7–10):

That to which the power of being moved by itself belongs in its being (οὐσίᾳ) cannot be moved by another except accidentally (κατὰ συμβεβηκός), just as what is good in itself or by itself (τὸ καθ' αὐτὸ ἀγαθὸν ἢ δι' αὐτό) cannot be good on account of another thing (δι' ἄλλο) or for the sake of another thing (ἐτέρου ἕνεκεν).

The second clause is important for our purposes: something that is good by its own causal power is good δι' αὐτό or καθ' αὐτό.<sup>27</sup> In fact, Aristotle provides a possible explanation of this connection between καθ' αὐτό and δι' αὐτό in *Posterior Analytics* 2.4, where he establishes four ways in which one can say that A belongs to B καθ' αὐτό.<sup>28</sup> The fourth way interests us here: "What belongs to a thing δι' αὐτό belongs καθ' αὐτό" (*Arist. An. post.* 73b10–11). Aristotle illustrates this by reference to conjoined events: "If something died while being sacrificed, it also died κατὰ the sacrifice since it died διὰ being sacrificed; it was not accidental that it died while being sacrificed" (73b13–16). Aristotle seems to think of the example in this way: "Death belongs to sacrifice κατὰ sacrifice because death belongs to sacrifice διὰ sacrifice." But if this connection between death and sacrifice is necessary—if there can be no sacrifice without death—then we should expect Aristotle to endorse the claim that every sacrifice is a death καθ' αὐτό precisely because every sacrifice is a death δι' αὐτό. Similarly, then, if the connection between friendship and virtue is necessary because of what it is to be a friendship—because of how friendship works—then Epicurus should be able to say that every friendship is a virtue καθ' αὐτήν precisely because every friendship is a virtue δι' αὐτήν. Hence, the parallels in Clement and Aristotle explain how Epicurus could have made a sensible point by saying that every friendship is δι' αὐτήν a virtue. His point would be that every friendship is a virtue by its own causal power and not by something extraneous to the friendship. This use of δι' αὐτήν is admittedly a bit unusual, but neither unmotivated nor entirely unparalleled.

We are left, then, weighing philological and philosophical disadvantages and advantages. The emended version of *Sententia Vaticana* 23 raises philosophical problems that can be escaped only by ignoring what is a perfectly clear and natural Greek expression, whereas the manuscript version expresses an intelligible philosophical point only by using what seems to be at least an unusual Greek expression. Yet it can be noted that Epicurus' Greek is notoriously unusual,<sup>29</sup> and this may make it all the

27. The close connection between δι' αὐτό and καθ' αὐτό is suggested in another way by the comparison of θεωρία τίμοι δι' αὐτὰς in the *Protrepticus* (frag. 27 Düring) and τῶν δι' αὐτὰ τιμίων at *Topics* 126b4 with τιμώτερον καθ' αὐτό at *Topics* 118b25.

28. This formula covers cases where A belongs to B κατὰ A and those where A belongs to B κατὰ B (see especially *An. post.* 73a34–73b1).

29. This point is hardly controversial, and has attracted attention in the studies of Widmann 1935 and Brescia 1955b. Unfortunately, neither of these studies sheds light on *Sent. Vat.* 23.

more plausible to suppose that Epicurus would have been using δι' ἑαυτὴν instead of καθ' ἑαυτὴν in order to register unconventionally the rather conventional point that friendship itself has causal power. But I confess that even were this not the case, so long as I am faced with a choice between an unnaturally constructed sentence that makes a good philosophical point and an emended, natural sentence that creates a serious philosophical inconsistency, I will prefer to believe that Epicurus wrote the former.

#### 4. SECOND ALTERNATIVE

But what if Epicurus did not write *Sententia Vaticana* 23 at all? We can step out from between the philosophical rock of the orthodox reading and the philological hard place of the manuscript by adopting an entirely different approach. We can accept the emendation by the force of the philological objection but still evade the philosophical problems of the orthodox reading by insisting that Epicurus is not the author.<sup>30</sup> This view of our sentence might at first smell faintly of desperation, but there is in fact good reason to take it.<sup>31</sup>

First, several of the sentences in the Vatican collection are elsewhere attributed to some author other than Epicurus. Körte's collection of the fragments of Metrodorus, for example, includes six of the Vatican sentences.<sup>32</sup> Others might well have been originally authored by someone other than Epicurus, including *Sententia Vaticana* 36: "The life of Epicurus, compared with the lives of others, might on account of its gentleness and self-sufficiency, be thought to be a fiction (μῦθος)." Even without engaging in a detailed consideration of the authorship of each of the *Sententiae Vaticanae*, we can easily see that we should not assume that each infallibly represents the Master's word.

Second, Cicero's testimony gives us reason to associate the claim made by the emended *Sententia Vaticana* 23 with certain Epicureans who were more timid (*timidiore*s) in the face of Academic criticism, and not with Epicurus (*Fin.* 1.69). First, we need to notice that these Epicureans advanced a view from which Cicero explicitly distances Epicurus (*Fin.* 2.82): namely, the view that friends love their friends for their own sakes (*amici propter se ipsos amentur*, *Fin.* 1.69). Second, we need to attend to Torquatus' explanation of how these "more timid" Epicureans reached their conclusion: they feared that "if we think that friendship is to be sought for the sake of our pleasure then all friendship would seem to be as it were lame" (*quasi claudicare*, *Fin.* 1.69). In sum, Cicero tells us that some Epicureans other than Epicurus bow to Academic criticisms, *reject* the claim that friendship is for the sake of pleasure alone, and admit of sources of motivation other than pleasure in order to say, for example, that friends are loved *per se*.

30. Of course, it is also possible to employ both alternatives simultaneously, i.e., to reject the emendation and to insist that someone other than Epicurus wrote the sentence. But the strongest reason to take one of these alternatives—to acquit Epicurus of a serious shortcoming—does not provide warrant for both simultaneously.

31. This alternative has not been widely considered, but it has been noted as a possibility by Arrighetti (1973, 559) and von der Mühl (1922, ad *Sent. Vat.* 23).

32. See Metrodorus frags. 37 (*Sent. Vat.* 10), 47 (*Sent. Vat.* 27), 48 (*Sent. Vat.* 45), 49 (*Sent. Vat.* 47), 51 (*Sent. Vat.* 31), and 53 (*Sent. Vat.* 30).

Two inferences should be drawn from Cicero's account.<sup>33</sup> First, some Epicureans must have maintained that friendship is choiceworthy only for the sake of pleasure to have provoked the Academic criticisms. By far the most natural assumption would be that Epicurus is at least among these bolder Epicureans. This assumption makes good sense of the chronology, and it fits well with our expectations about whom the Academics would have attacked most vigorously. Moreover, Cicero encourages us to make this assumption by distancing Epicurus from the more timid Epicureans (*Fin.* 2.82).

The second inference to be drawn from Cicero's account is that the later Epicureans who were willing to admit of sources of motivation other than one's own pleasure because they did not want to render friendship lame should have been perfectly willing to say that friendship is δι' ἑαυτὴν αἰρετή. Once they had given up insisting that every choice is for one's own pleasure, then there is no good reason to deny that friendship is chosen for its own sake, and they are on record as eager to protect the good name of friendship.

Thus, if we decide that *Sententia Vaticana* 23 must be emended to say that every friendship is δι' ἑαυτὴν αἰρετή, we should on the basis of Cicero's testimony attribute *Sententia Vaticana* 23 not to Epicurus but to the more timid Epicureans.

ERIC BROWN

Washington University in St. Louis

33. There is no reason to doubt Cicero's testimony concerning debates between Epicureans and Academic opponents. The summary of Peripatetic ethics preserved in Stobaeus 2.7 includes the claim that every friendship is δι' ἑαυτὴν αἰρετή (120.18 Wachsmuth), and the Academics could well have used this claim to make trouble for the Epicureans.

#### LITERATURE CITED

- Annas, J. 1993. *The Morality of Happiness*. Oxford.
- Arrighetti, G., ed. 1973. *Epicuro: Opere*<sup>2</sup>. Turin.
- Bailey, C., ed. 1926. *Epicurus: The Extant Remains*. Oxford.
- Bignone, E., ed. and trans. 1964. *Epicuro: Opere, frammenti, testimonianze sulla sua vita*. Rome.
- Bollack, J., ed. and trans. 1975. *La Pensée du plaisir: Épicure: textes moraux, commentaires*. Paris. (This contains [567–82] the chapter Les Maximes de l'amitié, previously published in *Actes du VIIIe Congrès de l'Association Guillaume Budé* [Paris, 1969].)
- Brescia, C. 1955a. La φιλία in Epicuro. *GIF* 8:314–32.
- \_\_\_\_\_. 1955b. *Ricerche sulla lingua e sullo stile di Epicuro*. Collana di Studi Greci 26. Naples.
- Diano, C., ed. 1946. *Epicuri Ethica*. Florence.
- Festugière, A. J. 1955. *Epicurus and His Gods*. Trans. C. W. Chilton. Oxford.
- Geer, R., ed. and trans. 1964. *Epicurus: "Letters," "Principal Doctrines," and "Vatican Sayings."* Indianapolis.
- Gemelli, B. 1978. L'amicizia in Epicuro. *Sandalion* 1:59–72.
- Inwood, B., and L. Gerson, eds. and trans. 1997. *Hellenistic Philosophy: Introductory Readings*<sup>2</sup>. Indianapolis.
- Konstan, D. 1996a. Friendship from Epicurus to Philodemus. In *Epicureismo greco e romano*, 2 vols., ed. G. Giannantoni and M. Gigante, 1:387–96. Naples.
- \_\_\_\_\_. 1996b. Greek Friendship. *AJP* 117:71–94.
- \_\_\_\_\_. 1997. *Friendship in the Classical World*. Cambridge.

- Long, A. A. 1986a. *Hellenistic Philosophy: Stoics, Epicureans, Sceptics*<sup>2</sup>. Berkeley and Los Angeles.
- . 1986b. Pleasure and Social Utility—The Virtues of Being Epicurean, with Discussion. In *Aspects de la philosophie hellénistique*, ed. H. Flashar and O. Gigon, 283–324. Entretiens sur l'Antiquité classique, 32. Geneva.
- Long, A. A., and D. N. Sedley. 1987. *The Hellenistic Philosophers*. 2 vols. Cambridge.
- MacFarlane, J. 1997. Egoism without Selfishness: Epicurus on Friendship. Unpublished.
- Marcovich, M., ed. 1999. Appendix: Gnomologium Epicureum Vaticanum. In *Diogenes Laertius: "Vitae Philosophorum,"* 1:815–26. Stuttgart.
- Mitsis, P. 1988. *Epicurus' Ethical Theory*. Ithaca. (This includes [98–128] the chapter Friendship and Altruism, an only slightly modified version of Epicurus on Friendship and Altruism, *OSAP* 5 [1987]:127–153.)
- Mühlh, P. von der, ed. 1922. *Epicuri epistulae tres et ratae sententiae a Laertio Diogene servatae*. Leipzig.
- Müller, R. 1972. Die Theorie der Freundschaft. In *Die Epikureische Gesellschaftstheorie*, Schriften zur Geschichte und Kultur der Antike 5, 112–29. Berlin.
- . 1991. Die Freundschaft als Lebensform. In *Die Epikureische Ethik*, Schriften zur Geschichte und Kultur der Antike 32, 110–29. Berlin.
- O'Connor, D. K. 1989. The Invulnerable Pleasures of Epicurean Friendship. *GRBS* 30:165–86.
- Preuss, P. 1994. Friendship. In *Epicurean Ethics: Katastematic Hedonism*, Studies in the History of Philosophy, vol. 35, 199–213. Lewiston, N.Y.
- Rist, J. M. 1972. *Epicurus: An Introduction*. Cambridge.
- . 1980. Epicurus on Friendship. *CP* 75:121–29.
- Rocca, J. 1993. Epicurean Friendship. In *Hellenistic Philosophy*, ed. K. Boudouris, 2:193–204. Athens.
- Sharples, R. W. 1996. *Stoics, Epicureans, and Sceptics: An Introduction to Hellenistic Philosophy*. London.
- Widmann, H. 1935. *Beiträge zur Syntax Epikurs*. Stuttgart.
- Wotke, C., and H. Usener. 1888. Epikurische Spruchsammlung. *WS* 10:175–201.

#### ON THE ETYMOLOGY AND INFLECTION OF *DARES* IN VERGIL'S BOXING MATCH, *AENEID* 5.362–484

This paper examines Vergil's application of an etymology for the name *Dares* that is found in both the ancient commentary on Homeric words and the late antique mythographer Fulgentius. It then considers Fulgentius' interpretation of Vergil's boxing match on its own and also in the light of an epistolary exchange between St. Jerome and St. Augustine. Finally, it analyzes the change in the inflection of Dares' name in the accusative case from *Daren* to *Dareta* in connection with the outcome of the bout in the *Aeneid*.

#### THE ETYMOLOGY

The A-scholia to the *Iliad* offer an etymology for the name Δάρης, a priest of Hephaestus at Troy in Book 5, that derives from δέρω ("flog, flay").<sup>1</sup> The derivation, as

The revision of this article is indebted to the constructive criticism of the anonymous reader at *CP*. All Vergil references are to the *Aeneid* unless otherwise noted.

1. Erbse 1971, E 9b 67–69 γέγονε δὲ τὸ Δάρης ἥτοι παρὰ τὸ δέριω καὶ ἐκδέρω (ἐοικός γὰρ ἱερεῖ), καὶ ἐχρῆν γε αὐτὸ εἶναι Δέρης ὡς Φέρης· ἐτράπη οὖν τὸ εἰς ἄ. ἢ παρὰ τὸ δαίω τὸ καίω ἐν πλεονασμῷ τοῦ ρ. ("The